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Abstract
In this paper stochastic dynamic programming is used to investigate land conversion decisions taken
by a multitude of landholders under uncertainty about the value of environmental services and irreversible
development. We study land conversion under competition on the market for agricultural products when
voluntary and mandatory measures are combined by the Government to induce adequate participation
in a conservation plan. We study the impact of uncertainty on the optimal conversion policy and discuss
conversion dynamics under di⁄erent policy scenarios on the basis of the relative long-run expected rate
of deforestation. Interestingly, we show that uncertainty, even if it induces conversion postponement in
the short-run, increases the average rate of deforestation and reduces expected time for total conversion
in the long run. Finally, we illustrate our ￿ndings through some numerical simulations.
keywords: optimal stopping, deforestation, payments for environmental services, natural
resources management.
jel classification: C61, D81, Q24, Q58.
￿We wish to thank Guido Candela for helpful comments. We are also grateful for comments and suggestions to participants at
the 12th International BIOECON conference; the 51st SIE conference; the 18th Annual EAERE Conference; the 8th workshop
of the International Society of Dynamic Games; and to seminar participants at FEEM & IEFE - Bocconi University, University
of Stirling and CERE - Ume￿ University. The usual disclaimer applies.
yDepartment of Economics, SLU, Uppsala, Sweden.
zDepartment of Economics, University of Padova, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and Centro Studi Levi-Cases, Italy.
Corresponding address: Department of Economics, University of Padova, Via del Santo, 33, 35123, Padova, Italy. Email:
michele.moretto@unipd.it, telephone: (+39)0498274265, fax: (+39)0498274211.
xDepartment of Economics, University of Brescia, and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy.
11 Introduction
As human population grows, the human-Nature con￿ ict has become more severe and natural habitats are
more exposed to conversion. On the one hand, clearing land to develop it may lead to the irreversible
reduction or loss of valuable environmental services (hereafter, ES) such as biodiversity conservation, carbon
sequestration, watershed control and provision of scenic beauty for recreational activities and ecotourism.
On the other hand, conserving land in its pristine state has an opportunity cost in terms of foregone pro￿ts
from economic activities (e.g. agriculture, commercial forestry) which can be undertaken once land has been
cleared.1
At a society level, the problem is then how to allocate the available land given two possible competing
and mutually exclusive uses, namely conservation and development. The choice should be taken by optimally
balancing social bene￿t and cost of conservation. However, despite its theoretical appeal, the idea of a social
planner who, once de￿ned a socially optimal land conversion rule, can implement it by simply commanding
the constitution of protected areas, is far from reality. In fact, since the majority of remaining ecosystems
are on land privately owned, the economic and political cost of such intervention would make the adoption
of command mechanisms by Governments unlikely (Langpap and Wu, 2004; Sierra and Russman, 2006). In
addition, as pointed out by Folke et al.(1996, p. 1019), "keeping humans out of nature through a protected-
area strategy may buy time, but it does not address the factors in society driving the loss of biodiversity".
In other words, protecting natural ecosystems through natural reserves and other protected areas may be a
signi￿cant step in the short-run to deal with severe and immediate threats but it still does not create the
structure of incentives able to mitigate the con￿ ict human-Nature in the long-run.
At least initially, Governments favoured an indirect approach in conservation policies. The main idea
behind this approach was to divert, through programs such as integrated conservation and development
projects, community-based natural resource management or other environment-friendly commercial ven-
tures, the allocation of labour and capital from ecosystem damaging activities toward ecosystem conserving
activities (Wells et al., 1992; Ferraro and Simpson, 2002). However, despite the initial enthusiasm, e⁄ec-
tiveness and cost-e¢ ciency concerns have led to abandonment of this approach in favour of compensations
to be paid directly to the landholders providing conservation services (see e.g. Ferraro, 2001; Ferraro and
Kiss, 2002; Ferraro and Simpson, 2005). A direct approach, mainly represented by schemes like Payments for
Environmental Services (hereafter, PES) has become increasingly common in both developed and developing
countries. Under a PES program, a provider delivers to a buyer a well-de￿ned ES (or corresponding land use)
in exchange for an agreed payment.2 Unfortunately, also the e¢ cacy of PES programs has been questioned
since their performance has not always met the established conservation targets.3 In particular, lack of
additionality in the conservation e⁄orts induced by the programs has often been suspected, i.e. landholders
have been paid for conserving the same extent of land they would have conserved without the program.4
Considering the limited amount of money for conservation initiatives and the perverse e⁄ect that wasting it
may have on future funding, further research is needed to increase our understanding of the economic agent￿ s
conversion decision.
The literature investigating optimal conservation decisions under irreversibility and uncertainty over the
net bene￿ts attached to conservation represents a signi￿cant branch of environmental and resource economics
(see among others Bulte et al., 2002, Kassar and Lassere, 2004; Leroux et al., 2009). A unifying aspect in
this literature is the stress on the e⁄ect that irreversibility and uncertainty have on decision making. In fact,
since irreversible conversion under uncertainty over future prospects may be later regretted, this decision
may be postponed to bene￿t from option value attached to the maintained ￿ exibility (Dixit and Pindyck,
1994). Pioneer papers such as Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974) have been followed by several
1See Barbier and Burgess (2001) for a theme issue on the economics of tropical deforestation and land use.
2In this respect we follow Wunder (2005, p. 3) where a PES is de￿ned as "(i) a voluntary transaction where (ii) a well-de￿ned
ES (or a land-use likely to secure that service) (iii) is being "bought" by a (minimum one) ES buyer (iv) from a (minimum one)
ES provider (v) if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality)".
3As reported by Ferraro (2001), this may be due to several reasons such as lack of funding, failures in institutional design,
poor de￿nition and weak enforcement of property rights and strategic behaviour by potential ES providers. See Ferraro (2008)
on information failures and Smith and Shogren (2002) on speci￿c contract design issues.
4We refer in particular to government-￿nanced programs. On the performance of user vs. government-￿nanced interventions
see Pagiola (2008) on PSA program in Costa Rica and Wunder et al. (2008) for a comparative analysis of PES programs
in developed and developing countries. See Ferraro and Pattanayak (2006) for a call on empirical monitoring of conservation
programs and Pattanayak et al. (2010) for a review of available studies.
2other papers dealing with new and challenging questions requiring more and more complex model set-up.5
Two contributions close to ours are Bulte et al. (2002) and Leroux et al. (2009). In the ￿rst paper, the
authors determine the socially optimal forest stock to be held by trading o⁄ pro￿t from agriculture and the
value of ES attached to forest conservation. Their analysis highlights the value of the option to postpone
land clearing under irreversibility of environmental impact and uncertainty about conservation bene￿ts. A
similar problem is solved in Leroux et al. (2009) where, unlike the previous paper, the authors allow for
ecological feedback and consider its impact both on the expected trend and volatility of the value of ES. Both
papers, however, by solving the allocative problem from a central planner perspective, miss the complexity
of challenges characterizing conservation policies and the role that competition on markets for agricultural
products may have on conversion decisions.
In this paper, we aim to investigate these issues by modelling conversion decisions in a decentralized
economy populated by a multitude of homogenous landholders where the Government has introduced a
payment scheme for conservation. Each landholder manages a portion of total available land and may
conserve or develop it by a⁄ording a conversion cost. ES provided by natural habitats on conserved land
have a value proportional to the preserved surface. Such value is stochastic and ￿ uctuates following a
geometric Brownian motion. When the parcel is developed then land enters as an input into the production
of private goods and/or services (co⁄ee, rubber, soy, palm oil, timber, biofuels, cattle, etc.) destined to a
competitive market.
In this context, the Government introduces a land use policy which aims to balance conservation and
development. The policy is based on a PES scheme implemented through a conservation contract. Such
contract ￿xes limits to the plot development (i.e. it may be totally or partially developed) and establishes
a compensation for land kept aside. In addition to the individual plot set-aside policy, we also consider the
possibility that the Government impose a limit on the total clearable forested land in the targeted area.
In this frame, we determine analytically the optimal conversion path and study the impact that di⁄erent
payment schemes may have on the conversion dynamics. Not surprisingly, conversion is postponed if a higher
compensation is paid to landholders conserving the entire plot. This is due to the higher opportunity cost
of conversion which is higher since it includes the payments implicitly given up converting. Interestingly, we
show that, as suggested by Ferraro (2001), a landholder may conserve the entire plot even if only partially
compensated for the provided ES. We note that only progressive reductions in the value of ES may induce
land clearing. Studying the impact of a limit on the aggregate conversion, we identify two possible scenarios.
In fact, depending on the total land surface privately worth to be developed, such limit may be binding
or not. If not binding then landholders stop converting land at an aggregate surface smaller than the one
targeted by the Government since pro￿ts from further land conversion are too low. If binding, on the
contrary, further conversion is pro￿table and then landholders, fearing a restriction in the exercise of the
option to convert, may start a conversion run6 which rapidly exhausts the forest stock up to the ￿xed limit.7
Comparing ￿rst-best and second-best conversion policy we identify the combination of policy parameters
leading to a ￿rst-best conversion policy.
To assess the temporal performance of the optimal conservation policy and study the impact of increasing
uncertainty about future environmental bene￿ts on conversion speed, we derive the long-run average growth
rate of deforestation. Interestingly, we show that higher uncertainty over payments, even if it induces
conversion postponement in the short-run, increases the average rate of deforestation and reduces expected
time for total conversion in the long run.
Finally, we run several numerical simulations based on the well known case of Costa Rica. Firstly, we
study the impact of di⁄erent conservation policies on the optimal forest stock and the expected long-run
average rate of deforestation. Second, given a certain initial forest stock, we rank di⁄erent policies on the
basis of long-run average rate of deforestation and expected total conversion time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic set-up for the model is
5Among them, see for instance Conrad (1980), Clarke and Reed (1989), Reed (1993), Conrad (1997), Conrad (2000).
6In Australia, the Productivity Commission reports evidence of pre-emptive clearing due to the introduction of clearing
restrictions (Productivity Commission, 2004). On unintended impacts of public policy see for instance Stavins and Ja⁄e (1990)
showing that, despite an explicit federal conservation policy, 30% of forested wetland conversion in the Mississippi Valley has
been induced by federal ￿ood-control projects. In this respect, see also M￿stad (2001) showing how timber trade restrictions
may induce an increase in logging.
7A similar e⁄ect has been ￿rstly noted by Bartolini (1993). In this paper, the author studies decentralized investment decision
in a market where a limit on aggregate investment is present.
3presented. In Section 3 we study the equilibrium in the conversion strategies and compare ￿rst-best and
second-best outcomes. In Section 4, we discuss issues related to the PES voluntary participation and contract
enforceability. Section 5 is devoted to the derivation of the long-run average rate of conversion. In Section
6 we illustrate our main ￿ndings through numerical exercises. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Dynamic Model of Land Conversion
Consider a country where at time period t ￿ 0 the total land available, L, is allocated as follows:
L = A(t) + F(t); with A(0) = A0 ￿ 0 (1)
where A(t) is the surface cultivated and F(t) is the portion still in its pristine natural state covered by a
primary forest.8
Assume that F(t) is divided into in￿nitesimally small and homogenous parcels of equal extent held by a
multitude of identical risk-neutral landholders.9 By normalizing such extent to 1 hectare, F(t) denotes also
the number of agents in the economy.10
Natural habitats provide valuable environmental goods and services at each time period t.11 Let denote by




= ￿dt + ￿dz(t); with B(0) = B0 (2)
where ￿ and ￿ are respectively the drift and the volatility parameters, and dz(t) is the increment of a Wiener
process.12
At each t, two competitive and mutually exclusive destinations may be given to forested land: conservation
or irreversible development. Once the plot is cleared, the landholder becomes a farmer using land as an input
for agricultural production (or commercial forestry).13
8As in Bulte et al. (2002) A0 may represent the best land which has been already converted to agriculture.
9For the sake of generality we simply refer to landholders. In our model in fact, as quite common in a developing country
scenario, the appropriability of values attached to land is not conditional on the existence of a legal entitlement. See Gregersen
et al. (2010).
10None of our results relies on this assumption. In fact, provided that no single agent has signi￿cant market power, we can
obtain identical results by allowing each agent to own more than one unit of land. See e.g. Baldursson (1998) and Grenadier
(2002).
11They may include biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration, watershed control, provision of scenic beauty for recre-
ational activities and ecotourism, timber and non-timber forest products. See e.g. Conrad (1997), Conrad (2000), Clarke and
Reed (1989), Reed (1993), Bulte et al. (2002).
12The Brownian motion in (2) is a reasonable approximation for conservation bene￿ts and we share this assumption with
most of the existing literature. Conrad (1997, p. 98) considers a geometric Brownian motion for the amenity value as a plausible
assumption to capture uncertainty over individual preferences for amenity. Bulte et al. (2002, p.152) point out that "parameter
￿ can be positive (e.g., re￿ecting an increasingly important carbon sink function as atmospheric CO2 concentration rises), but
it may also be negative (say, due to improvements in combinatorial chemistry that lead to a reduced need for primary genetic
material)". However, this assumption neglects the direct feedback e⁄ect that conversion decisions may have on the stochastic
process illustrating the dynamic of conservation bene￿ts. See Leroux et al. (2009) for a model where such e⁄ect is accounted
by letting conservation bene￿ts follow a controlled di⁄usion process with both drift and volatility depending on the conversion
path.
13In the following, "landholder" refers to an agent conserving land and "farmer" to an agent cultivating it.
42.1 The Government
ES usually have the nature of public good. To induce their provision we assume that at time period t = 0
the Government o⁄ers a contract to be accepted on a voluntary basis by each farmer. A compensation equal
to ￿1B(t) with ￿1 2 [0;1] is paid at each time period t if the entire plot is conserved. On the contrary, if
the landholder aims to develop his/her parcel, a restriction is imposed in that a portion of the total surface,
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, must be conserved.14 In this case, a payment equal to ￿￿2B(t) with ￿2 2 [0;￿1]15 may be o⁄ered
to compensate the landholder.16
In addition, besides ￿ the Government ￿xes an upper level ￿ A on total land conversion. These two
limits may be ￿xed to account for critical ecological thresholds at which, if crossed, the ES provision may
dramatically lower or vanish.17 It is straightforward to see that depending on the magnitude of ￿ the
existence of a ceiling may preclude land development for some landholders. To account for this outcome
we denote by ￿ N =
￿ A
1￿￿ the number of potential farmers involved in the conversion process and assume
￿ N ￿ F(0).
Our framework is general enough to include di⁄erent conservation targets such as old-growth forests
or habitat surrounding wetlands, marshes, lagoons or by the marine coastline and meet several spatial
requirements. For instance, the conservation target may be represented by an area divided into homogenous
parcels running along a river or around a lake or a lagoon where, to maintain a signi￿cant provision of
ecosystem services, a portion of each parcel must be conserved (see ￿gure 1). As stressed by the literature
in spatial ecology, the creation of bu⁄er areas, by managing the proximity of human economic activities, is
crucial since it guarantees the e¢ ciency of conservation measures in the targeted areas.18 In this case the
conservation program may be induced by implementing a payment contract schedule di⁄erentiating for the
state of land i.e. totally conserved vs. developed within the restriction enforced through environmental law.
However, we are also able to consider the opposite case where the landholder may totally develop his/her
plot but an upper limit is ￿xed on the total extent of land which can be cleared in the region.19
14In Brazil, for instance, according to the legal reserve regulation a private owner must keep the 20% (80% in the Amazon)
of the surface in the property covered by forest or its native vegetation (Alston and Mueller, 2007). The choice of ￿ may
account for considerations related to habitat fragmentation, critical ecological thresholds, enforcement and transaction costs
for the program implementation, etc. Finally, note that our analysis is general enough to include also the case where ￿ is not
imposed but is endogenously set by each landholder. In fact, due for instance to ￿nancial constraints limiting the extent of the
development project, the landholders may ￿nd optimal not to convert the entire plot (Pattanayak et al., 2010).
15A lower payment rate can be justi￿ed on the basis of a less valuable ES provision due to the disturbance, implicitly produced
by developing the plot, to the previously intact natural habitat. For instance, one may assume that an unique payment rate ￿
is ￿xed but that once the plot is developed the per-unit ES value, B(t); is lowered by some k 2 [0;1). It is straightforward to
see that by simply setting ￿2 = k￿1 our results would still hold.
16As pointed out by Engel et al. (2008), by internalizing external non-market values from conservation, PES schemes have
attracted increasing interest as mechanisms to induce the provision of ES. Consistently, the payment rates, ￿1 and ￿2, may be
interpreted as the levels of appropriability that the society is willing to guarantee on the value generated by conserving, i.e. B(t)
and ￿B(t) respectively. Finally, note that as ￿1 and ￿2 are constant then payments also follow a geometric Brownian motion
(easily derivable from (2)). However, this is di⁄erent from the way payments are modelled in Isik and Yang (2004) where they
also depend on the ￿uctuations in the conservation cost opportunity (pro￿t from agriculture, changes in environmental policy,
etc.).
17On ecosystem resilience, threshold e⁄ects and conservation policies see Perrings and Pearce (1994). Note that the quality
of our results would not change if one characterized ￿ A as the expected surface at which the Government will impede further
land conversion.
18See for instance Hansen and Rotella (2002) and Hansen and DeFries (2007).
19This could be the case for an area covered by a tropical forest (Bulte et al., 2002; Leroux et al., 2009), or a protected area
where farmers located next to the site may sustainably extract natural resources (Tisdell, 1995; Wells et al., 1992).
5Figure 1: Land conversion with bu⁄er areas
2.2 The Landholders
Developing the parcel is an irreversible action which has a sunk cost, (1￿￿)c, including cost for clearing and
settling land for agriculture.20 Denoting by A(t) the total land developed at time t, the number of farmers
must be equal to N(t) =
A(t)
1￿￿ and since 1 ￿ ￿ is ￿xed, the conversion dynamic must mirror the variation in
the number of farmers, i.e. dN(t) =
dA(t)
1￿￿ . Therefore, assuming that the extent of each plot is small enough
to exclude any potential price-making consideration, we may use either N(t) or A(t) when evaluating the
individual decision process.21 Competition on the market for agricultural products implies that at each time
period t the optimal number of farmers (or the optimal total land developed) is determined by the entry
zero pro￿t condition. In addition, since the per-parcel value of services, B(t), makes all agents symmetric.
We assume a constant elasticity demand function for agricultural products PA(t) = ￿A(t)￿￿ with ￿ > 0
and ￿ > 0: The parameter ￿ illustrates di⁄erent states of the demand while ￿￿ is the inverse of the demand
elasticity.
Now, let￿ s solve for the conversion process taking ￿1, ￿2 and ￿ as exogenously given parameters. Denoting
by PA(t) the marginal return as land is cleared over time, the farmer instantaneous pro￿t function is given
by:
￿(A(t);B(t); ￿ A) = (1 ￿ ￿)PA(t) + ￿￿2B(t) (3)


















20Bulte et al., (2002, p. 152) de￿ne c as "the marginal land conversion cost". It "may be negative if there is a positive
one-time net bene￿t from logging the site that exceeds the costs of preparing the harvested site for crop production". We also
assume, without loss of generality, that the conversion cost is proportional to the surface cleared.
21To consider in￿nitesimally small agents is a standard assumption in in￿nite horizon models investigating dynamic industry
equilibrium under competition. See for instance Jovanovic (1982), Dixit (1989), Hopenhayn (1992), Lambson (1992), Dixit and
Pindyck (1994, chp. 8), Bartolini (1993), Caballero and Pindyck (1996), Dosi and Moretto (1992) and Moretto (2008).
22Note that the expected value is taken accounting for A(t) increasing over time as land is cleared. See Harrison (1985, p.
44).
6where r is the constant risk-free interest rate,23 ￿￿(A(t);B(t); ￿ A)=(1 ￿ ￿)PA(t) + (￿￿2 ￿ ￿1)B(t) and ￿ is
the stochastic conversion time.
In (4) the ￿rst term represents the perpetuity paid by the Government if the parcel is conserved, while
the second term represents the extra pro￿t that each landholder may expect if she/he clears the land and
becomes a farmer. The extra pro￿t is given by the crop yield sold on the market plus the di⁄erence in
the payments received by the Government. As soon as the excess pro￿t from land development equals the
deforestation cost, the landholder may clear the parcel. This implies that the optimal conversion timing
depends only on the second term in (4).
3 The Competitive Equilibrium
Denote by V (A(t);B(t); ￿ A) the value function of an in￿nitely living farmer.24 By (4), the optimal conversion
time, ￿, solves the following maximization problem:25






￿￿(A;B; ￿ A)dt ￿ I[t=￿](1 ￿ ￿)c
￿
dtg (5)
where I[t=￿] is an indicator function stating that at the time of conversion, due to market competition
among farmers, the value attached to land conversion must equal the cost of land clearing. In the real
option literature the problem we must solve is referred to as "optimal stopping" (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
The idea is that at any point in time the value of immediate investment (stopping) is compared with the
expected value of waiting over the next dt (continuation), given the information available at that point in
time (the stock of land developed, A, and the value of the stochastic variable B) and the knowledge of the
two processes, i.e. dA and dB. If the initial size of the active farmers is A ￿ A0, we expect the converting
process to work as follows: for a ￿xed number of farmers, pro￿ts in (3) move stochastically driven only by
B. As soon as the per-parcel value of ES reaches a critical level, say B￿(A), development (i.e. entry into
the agricultural market) becomes feasible. This implies an increase, dA, in cultivated land and a drop in
revenues from agriculture along the demand function PA(A). The value of services will then continue to
move stochastically until the next entry occurs.
Let V (A;B; ￿ A) be twice-di⁄erentiable in B, and expand dV (A;B; ￿ A) using Ito￿ s Lemma. Then, in the




￿2B2VBB(A;B; ￿ A) + ￿BVB(A;B; ￿ A) ￿ rV (A;B; ￿ A)+ (6)
+
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿A￿￿ + (￿￿2 ￿ ￿1)B
￿
= 0
This is an ordinary di⁄erential equation since the number of farmers is constant. Using standard arguments
the general solution is (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994):
V (A;B; ￿ A) = Z1(A)B￿1 + Z2(A)B￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿A￿￿
r




where 1 < ￿1 < r=￿, ￿2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equation Q(￿) = 1
2￿2￿(￿￿1)+￿￿￿r = 0 and
Z1, Z2 are two constants to be determined.
23The introduction of risk aversion does not change the results since the analysis can be developed under a risk-neutral
probability measure for B(t). See Cox and Ross (1976) for further details.
24As we show in the appendix (A.2), the problem can be equivalently solved considering a landholder evaluating the option
to develop.
25In the following we will drop the time subscript for notational convenience.
26In our setting the (competitive) equilibrium bounding the pro￿t process for each farmer can be constructed as a symmetric
Nash equilibrium in entry strategies. By the in￿nite divisibility of F, the equilibrium can be determined by simply looking
at the single landholder clearing policy which is de￿ned ignoring the competitors￿entry decisions (see Leahy, 1993). Consider
a short interval dt where no conversion takes place. Over this interval A is constant and the farmer holds an asset paying
￿￿(A;B; ￿ A)dt as cash ￿ow and E[dV (A;B; ￿ A)] as capital gain. If the farmer is active then the cash ￿ow and the expected
capital gain must equal the risk-neutral return, that is rV (A;B; ￿ A)dt = ￿￿(A;B; ￿ A)dt + E[dV (A;B; ￿ A)].
7To determine the optimal conversion threshold, B￿(A), the landholder must consider bene￿ts and costs
attached to conversion. According to (7), the pro￿t accruing from the crop yield, (1 ￿ ￿)￿A
￿￿
r , is counter-
balanced by the di⁄erence in the payments, (￿￿2 ￿￿1) B
r￿￿, received for conservation. In addition, note that
as landholders convert land and become farmers pro￿t from agriculture decreases. This negative e⁄ect on
the value of converted land is accounted for in (7) by the second term (Z2(A) ￿ 0 for A ￿ ￿ A). In fact,
since by assumption ￿1 ￿ ￿2 implies ￿1 > ￿￿2 then only an expected reduction in B can induce conver-
sion.27 Since ￿1 > 0 then to keep V (A;B; ￿ A) ￿nite we must drop the ￿rst term by setting Z1 = 0, i.e.
limB!1 V (A,B; ￿ A) = 0. Hence, (7) reduces to:
V (A;B; ￿ A) = Z2(A)B￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿A￿￿
r




To determine Z2(A) and B￿(A) some suitable boundary conditions on (8) are required. First, development
by increasing the number of competing farmers in the market keeps the value of being an active farmer below
(1 ￿ ￿)c. Second, marginal rents for an active farmer must be null at B￿(A). These considerations can be
formalized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Provided that each agent rationally forecasts the future dynamics of the market for agricul-
tural goods for land to be converted, the following condition must hold
V (A;B￿(A); ￿ A) = (1 ￿ ￿)c (9)
where the conversion rule is
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Proof. See appendix A.1.
In Proposition 1, we denote by ^ A the last parcel for which conversion makes economic sense (i.e. ￿
r ^ A￿￿ ￿
c = 0) and by A+ the surface at which a conversion run starts (i.e. B￿(A+) = B￿( ￿ A)):
Note that for conversion to be optimal, the dynamic zero pro￿t condition in (9) must hold at the threshold,
B￿(A). By rearranging (9) we obtain
Z2(A)B￿(A)






= (1 ￿ ￿)c + ￿1
B￿(A)
r ￿ ￿
This condition says that bene￿ts from becoming a farmer must equal the opportunity cost of conversion, i.e.
the cost of land clearing plus the payment perpetuity which is implicitly given up, as stated in equation (4),
by converting.
By Proposition 1 the whole conversion dynamics are characterized in terms of B. Since the agent￿ s size
is in￿nitesimal, the trigger B￿(A) must be a decreasing function of A. In both ￿gure 2 and 3 conservation
is optimal in the region above the curve. In fact, in this region, B is high enough to deter conversion
and each landholder conserves up to the time where B driven by (2) drops to B￿(A). Then, as B crosses
27Di Corato et al. (2010) show that by relaxing such assumption also an expected increase in B may induce land conversion.
8B￿(A) from above, a discrete mass of landholders will enter the agricultural market developing (part of )
their land. Since higher competition reduces pro￿ts from agriculture, entries take place until conditions for
conservation are restored (B > B￿(A)). Further, Proposition 1 also shows that even if the ES provided by a
targeted ecosystem is not entirely compensated for, i.e. ￿1 ￿ 1, the Government may still be able to induce
landholders to conserve their plot.28
Depending on ￿ A, we obtain two di⁄erent scenarios (see ￿gure 2 and 3):
(1) if ^ A ￿ ￿ A, the conversion process stops at ^ A. This in turn implies that the surface, ￿ A ￿ ^ A ￿ 0, is
conserved forever at a total cost equal to ￿1
B
r￿￿( ￿ A ￿ ^ A).
Figure 2: Optimal conversion threshold with ^ A ￿ ￿ A
(2) if ^ A > ￿ A, land is converted smoothly up to A+ following the curve (10 bis(a)). If the surface of cultivated
land falls within the interval A+ ￿ A ￿ ￿ A, when B hits the threshold B￿(A), the landholders start
a run for conversion up to ￿ A. Unlike the previous case, here the limit imposed by the Government
binds and restricts conversion on a surface, ￿ A￿ ^ A > 0 where development would be pro￿table from the
landholder￿ s viewpoint. The intuition behind this result is immediate if we take a backward perspective.
When the limit imposed by the Government ￿ A is reached, then it must be Z2( ￿ A) = 0 since no new entry






from which we obtain (10bis (b)) as optimal trigger. This implies that at ￿ A marginal rents induced
by future reduction in B are not null, i.e. VB( ￿ A;B; ￿ A) < 0, and they would be entirely captured by
market incumbents. Since each single landholder realizes the bene￿t from marginally anticipating his
entry decision, then an entry run occurs to avoid the restriction imposed by the Government. However,
by rushing, the rent attached to information on market pro￿tability, collectable by waiting, vanishes.
Therefore there will be a land extent (i.e. a number of farmers), A+ < ￿ A, such that for A < A+ no
landholder ￿nds it convenient to rush since the marginal advantages from a future reduction in B are
lower than the option value lost.29 Note also that, as A+ is given by B￿(A+) = B￿( ￿ A), the threshold
in (10bis), triggering the run, results in the traditional NPV break-even rule (see Appendix A.1).30
28This result is in line with Ferraro (2001, p. 997) where the author states that conservation practitioners "may also ￿nd
that they do not need to make payments for an entire targeted ecosystem to achieve their objectives. They need to include only
"just enough" of the ecosystem to make it unlikely, given current economic conditions, infrastructure, and enforcement levels,
that anyone would convert the remaining area to other uses".
29This means the A+th is the last landholder for whom VB(A+;B￿(A+); ￿ A) = 0:
30In Bartolini (1993) a similar result is obtained. Under linear adjustment costs and stochastic returns, investment cost is
constant up to the investment limit where it becomes in￿nite. As a reaction to this external e⁄ect, recurrent runs may occur
under competition as aggregate investment approaches the ceiling. See also Moretto (2008).
9Figure 3: Optimal conversion threshold with ^ A > ￿ A
3.1 Comparative statics
As shown in table 1 the de￿nition of the last plot, ^ A, which is worth converting, depends on parameters
regulating the demand for agricultural goods, the interest rate and the land unit conversion cost. A higher
￿ illustrating a higher demand for agricultural products and/or a more rigid demand moves ^ A forward since
higher pro￿ts support the conversion for a larger land surface. Similarly, as c ! 0, all the available land will
be cultivated ( ^ A ! ￿ A). With a higher r future returns from agriculture become relatively lower with respect
to the cost of clearing land and land conversion is less attractive.
Table 1: Comparative statics on ^ A and B￿(A)
In table 1, we provide some comparative statics illustrating the e⁄ect that changes in the exogenous pa-
rameters have on the threshold level B￿(A). Changes in an exogenous parameter, whenever increasing
(decreasing) conversion bene￿ts with respect to conservation bene￿ts, rede￿ne, by moving upward (down-
ward) the boundary B￿(A), the conversion and conservation regions. In this light, for instance, to a higher
￿ corresponds higher pro￿ts from agriculture and thus a higher B￿(A) and a larger conversion region. The
same e⁄ect is also produced by a relatively more inelastic demand. On the contrary, the opposite occurs as
c increases since a higher conversion cost decreases net conversion bene￿ts. With an increase in the interest
10rate, exercise of the option to convert should be anticipated but this e⁄ect is too weak to prevail over the
e⁄ect that a higher r has on the opportunity cost of conversion. Studying the e⁄ect of volatility, ￿, and
of growth parameter, ￿, the sign of the derivatives is in line with the standard insight in the real options
literature. An increase in the growth rate and volatility of B determines postponed exercise of the option
to convert. This can be explained by the need to reduce the regret of taking an irreversible decision under
uncertainty. Since the cost of this decision is growing at a faster rate and there is uncertainty about its
magnitude, waiting to collect information about future prospects is a sensible strategy.
In ￿gure 4 and 5 we illustrate the impact on the conversion threshold of a change in ￿ and ￿ when A < ^ A,
respectively.31 The comparative statics above are con￿rmed. As ￿ increases the land development run is
postponed. The interpretation is straightforward. In fact, a higher expected growth in the value of ES, by
raising the opportunity cost of conversion, makes land development less attractive. This in turn reduces the
regret for being halted by the ceiling A on land development imposed by the government. On the contrary,
as ￿ soars the run is anticipated. This e⁄ect may seem counterintuitive since a higher ￿ lowers the conversion
barrier. However, by the convexity of B￿(A), as the land is developed a decrease of the level of B induces
conversion on larger surfaces. Hence, since a higher volatility of B increases the probability of reaching the
conversion barrier then landowners start running earlier in that it becomes more likely that the ceiling A
may be binding.
Figure 4: Optimal conversion barriers for r = 0:07; ￿ = 0:1;
c = 500 and A = 281375
31Figure 4 and 5 are obtained using the calibration adopted for the numerical exercise developed in Section 6.
11Figure 5: Optimal conversion barriers for r = 0:07; ￿ = 0:05;
c = 500 and A = 281375
Let￿ s consider now the conservation policy parameters. As expected, an increase in ￿1 pushes the barrier
downward since it makes it more pro￿table to conserve the plot and keep open the option to convert. In
line with this result, the barrier responds in the opposite way to an increase in ￿2 which implicitly provides
an incentive to conversion. Changes in ￿ have a monotonic e⁄ect. A higher ￿ de￿nes a stricter requirement
on development that may push the barrier downward for two reasons. First, a lower return from agriculture
since less land is cultivated which is, however, balanced by a lower cost for clearing land, and second, since
￿1 > ￿2 then a higher payment on the marginal unit which the farmer is required to set aside is guaranteed if
the plot is totally conserved. By using the second consideration the optimal conversion rule must be clearly
independent on ￿ when ￿1 = ￿2.
These considerations mostly hold for both (10) and (10 bis). Clearly, over the interval A+ < A ￿ ￿ A since
the option multiple,
￿2
￿2￿1, drops out, the barrier B￿(A) is not a⁄ected by ￿. The derivative with respect to





> 0 for r < ￿(
^ A
￿ A)￿
￿ 0 for r ￿ ￿(
^ A
￿ A)￿ for A+ < A ￿ ￿ A
Finally, since by (10bis) the same level of B triggers the entry of a positive mass of landholders, i.e. B￿(A+) =
B￿( ￿ A), it is worth highlighting that the surface at which the conversion rush starts (A+) is independent of the
de￿nition of ￿1, ￿2 and ￿. The Government policy may either speed up or slow down the conversion dynamic
but it cannot alter A+ which depends only on the choice of ￿ A with respect to ^ A. Note that @A+=@ ￿ A > 0 which
reasonably means that as ￿ A ! ^ A the run would be triggered only by a relatively lower level for B. In other
words, since in expected terms a higher ￿ A implies a less strict threat of being regulated, then landholders
are not willing to give up information rents collectable by waiting. Not surprisingly, @A+=@ ^ A < 0. A lower
^ A implies a faster drop in the pro￿t from agriculture as A increases and then a lower incentive for the
conversion run.
3.2 First vs second-best policies
A natural benchmark for our analysis is represented by the socially optimal conversion policy. Since a social
planner does not need to impose the individual restriction ￿; its optimal strategy can be obtained from (10)











c for A0 < A ￿ ^ A (11)
Note that for ^ A ￿ ￿ A this is the ￿rst-best conversion strategy in Bulte et al. (2002). In our model, it is
immediate to show that several combinations of the second-best tools ￿1; ￿2 and ￿ result in ￿ = 1 and lead
to the ￿rst-best conversion policy. In particular, explicating such combinations in terms of ￿2, the ￿rst-best
outcome correspond to the relationship ￿2 = 1 ￿
1￿￿1
￿ . However, we observe that this result would not hold
when ^ A > ￿ A. In this case, even if the triple (￿1;￿2;￿) is such that ￿ = 1 the ￿rst and second-best conversion
policies would overlap only up to A+. In fact, once reached the level A+ the second-best land clearing
process, due to the start of a conversion run, accelerates and rapidly exhausts the available forest stock.
Out of the ￿rst-best optimal conversion path (￿ 6= 1) the two following scenarios may arise (see ￿gures
6 and 7): ￿
BFB < B￿(A) for ￿2 > 1 ￿
1￿￿1
￿ (a)
BFB > B￿(A) otherwise (b)
(11 bis)
In ￿gure 6 the area below the full line is the set of feasible payment rates (0 ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿1) while the dotted
line represents the combination of policy parameters leading to a ￿rst-best conversion policy for any given
￿ (￿2 = 1 ￿
1￿￿1
￿ ). The feasible area is split in two regions where depending on the triple (￿1;￿2;￿), the
second-best conversion process may be in expected terms faster (￿ > 1: case (a)) or slower (￿ < 1: case
(b)) than the ￿rst-best one.
Figure 6: First-best vs. second-best policies for r = 0:07; ￿ = 0:05;
￿ = 0:1; c = 500 and A = 281375
It is immediate to note that
Corollary 1
a) For ￿1 ￿ 1￿ ￿ the second-best conversion process can never be slower than in ￿rst-best.
b) As ￿ ! 0 then the region where BFB > B￿(A) shrinks no matters the level of ￿2.
32In other words, a competitive equilibrium evolves as maximizing solution for the expected present value of social welfare in
the form of consumer surplus (Lucas and Prescott, 1971; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, ch.9).
13The ￿rst result (a) holds even when the Government, to deter development, expropriates the portion ￿
without any compensation (￿2 = 0). Finally, result (b) suggests the use of higher ￿1 or lower ￿2 to contrast
the e⁄ect of a less strict set-aside requirement, ￿. The opposite considerations can be formulated for ￿ ! 1.
Figure 7: First-best vs. second-best policies
4 Voluntary participation or contract enforceability?
Once the optimal conversion rules have been determined, we focus in this section on the issue of voluntary
participation which is a crucial aspect in a PES scheme (Wunder, 2005). In this respect, two elements must
be considered. First, the dynamic of the whole conversion process involving all the landholders who enrolled
under the conservation program. Second, the restrictions on land development that the Government may
wish to impose in the form of takings on landholders not entering the conservation program.33
A conservation contract may be accepted on a voluntary basis only if each landholder is better-o⁄signing
it than not. As it can be easily seen, the acceptance will crucially depend on the expectation concerning
the ability of the Government to impose a ￿ > 0 to landholder not enrolling under the PES scheme. Let￿ s
formalize this consideration assuming that no compensation is paid if a taking occurs. Since by Proposition
1 the conversion is optimal at B￿(A) then an in￿nitely living landholder signs the contract if and only if:
￿1
r ￿ ￿






where ￿ 2 [0;1] is the probability of regulation, i.e. the restriction ￿ holds also for landholders not signing
the contract. In (12) the LHS describes the position of a landholder within the program while on the RHS
we have the expected present value for a landholder not accepting the contract and developing land at time
t. Note that in the last case the conversion option is exercised as soon as the expected cost of conversion,
(1 ￿ ￿￿)c, equals the expected bene￿t from conversion. Rearranging (12) yields:
￿1
r ￿ ￿
B￿(A) + (1 ￿ ￿)c ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)c (13)
33Although most of the PES programs in developing countries were introduced as quid pro quo for legal restrictions on land
clearing, there are no speci￿c contract conditions preventing the landholder from clearing the area enrolled under the program
(Pagiola, 2008, p. 717). In principle, sanctions may apply. For instance, in the PSA (Pagos por Servicios Ambientales) program
in Costa Rica, payments received plus interest should be returned by the landholders exiting the scheme (FONAFIFO, 2007).
However, in a developing country context, economic and political costs may reduce the enforcement of such sanction.
14which holds if
￿1B￿(A) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(r ￿ ￿)c ￿ 0
where (r ￿￿)c is the annualized conversion cost. Depending on the parameters this condition may not hold
for some A. Note in fact that since B￿(A) is a decreasing function of A then (13) implies that:
Proposition 2 If ￿ 2 [0;1) then contract acceptance can be voluntary for some but not all the landholders
in the conservation program.
Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 1.
Segerson and Miceli (1998) show that if the probability of future regulation is positive then a voluntary
agreement can always be reached. By Proposition 2 we show that this result does not hold in our frame. In
fact, uncertainty about future regulation does not allow capturing of all the agents who can be potentially
regulated. A similar result is obtained by Langpap and Wu (2004) in a regulator-landowner two-period
model for conservation decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility. In their paper, since contract pay-o⁄s
are uncertain and signing is an irreversible decision, under certain conditions a landholder may not accept it
to stay ￿ exible. Unlike them, we show that under the same threat of regulation a contract can be voluntarily
signed by some landholders and not by others. Not surprisingly, imposing by contract constraints on land
development reduces ￿ exibility and discourages voluntary participation. Clearly, due to decreasing pro￿t
from agriculture, this holds for some landholders but not for all since entering the conservation program
becomes more attractive as land is progressively cleared.
Summing up, the voluntary participation crucially depends on the likelihood of takings but also on the
magnitude of the compensation payment which a court may impose. In fact, needless to say, if takings can be
compensated, then the requirement for contract acceptance becomes more stringent and it is more di¢ cult
to sustain agreements on a voluntary basis.34
5 The long-run average rate of forest conversion
We have shown above that even if not entirely compensated (￿1 ￿ 1) landholders may still conserve their
plot in its pristine state. However, their "inertia" addresses only "statically" the conservation/development
dilemma since they will develop their plots as soon as it will become pro￿table. Hence, in this section we
focus on the temporal implications of the optimal conversion policy, i.e. how long it takes to clear the
target surface ￿ A, and on the impact of increasing uncertainty about future environmental bene￿ts, B, and
conversion cost, c, on conversion speed. As main instrument for this analysis, in the following lines we derive
a long-run average growth rate of forest conversion (see A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix).
Let￿ s consider the case where b A ￿ ￿ A. This represents the more interesting case since the analysis below
remains valid also for the opposite case over the range A < A+. Note in fact that for A ￿ A+ the long-run











B for ￿ < ^ ￿ (14)
where ￿ indicates a regulated process in the sense of Harrison (1985, chp. 2) with ^ ￿ =
￿2
￿2￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)c as upper
re￿ ecting barrier.
The ￿rst term on the RHS of (14) represents the expected discounted pro￿t from the cultivation of land
conditional on the number of farmers remaining constant. The multiple
￿2
￿2￿1 < 1 accounts for the presence
of uncertainty and irreversibility. The second term is the expected discounted ￿ ow of payments implicitly
given up by developing land net of the payments for conservation paid for setting aside ￿ as required by the
Government. When a reduction of B drives ￿ upward toward ^ ￿ then some landholders may ￿nd pro￿table
land conversion. New entries in the market, however, determine a drop along PA (A) which by balancing for
the e⁄ect of B prevents ￿ from rising above ^ ￿. It follows that since entry is instantaneous then the rate of
deforestation is in￿nite at ^ ￿.35 Conversely, if ￿ < ^ ￿ the level of B is high enough to support conservation, no
34On compensation and land taking see Adler (2008).
35The fact that at ^ ￿ the rate of conversion is in￿nite follows from the non-di⁄erentiability of B and then of A with respect to
the time t (see Harrison, 1985; Dixit, 1993).
15entries occur and consequently the deforestation rate is null. Hence, the re￿ ecting barrier ^ ￿ does not generate
a ￿nite rate of deforestation over time but long periods of inaction followed by short periods of rapid bursts
of land conversion.
However, if a steady state distribution for ￿ exists within the range (￿1;^ ￿) then it would be always
possible to obtain the corresponding marginal distribution for A. This in turn would allow us to determine
the long-run average growth rate of forest conversion. Note that since A and B enter additively in (14) the
derivation of a steady-state distribution for A is not straightforward. After some tedious algebra, in the
appendix we show that:
Proposition 3 For any initial condition ( ~ B; ~ A) such that ￿( ~ B; ~ A) = ^ ￿ then relations (10) and (10bis) can
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￿ [1 ￿ (
~ A
^ A)￿] for ￿ < 1
2￿2
0 for ￿ ￿ 1
2￿2 (15b)
where A0 ￿ ~ A < ^ A and ^ A = ( ￿
rc)1=￿.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Thus, if ~ B is the current value of ES and, by (10), ~ A is the corresponding current optimal surface of
converted land, the expression in (15b) is the best guess for the average rate at which the forested surface,
￿ A￿ ~ A, is cleared. Remember that if ~ A > ^ A then the deforestation rate is null since ￿
rA￿￿ < c for ^ A < A ￿ A.
It is straightforward to verify that the rate in (15b) is increasing in the volatility of future payments for
￿ < 1
2￿2. Although at a ￿rst glance this result may seem counterintuitive, it follows from the distribution
of the log-normal process ￿ with an upper re￿ ecting barrier at ^ ￿. A higher volatility has two distinct e⁄ects.
First, it pushes the barrier ^ ￿ downward; second, by increasing the positive skewness of the distribution of
￿, it raises the probability of the barrier being reached.36 Both e⁄ects induce a higher rate of deforestation
in both the short-run and long-run. On the contrary for ￿ ￿ 1
2￿2 the process ￿ drives away from ^ ￿ and the
rate falls to zero.
Furthermore, the rate in (15b) is decreasing in c: The conversion cost has two opposite e⁄ects on the
expected land clearing speed. The ￿rst prevailing e⁄ect is immediate and due to the direct braking impact
of a more costly decision. The second is more subtle. Since future land clearing will be triggered by a
decreasing B then, by delaying conversion, to a higher c corresponds a lower conversion opportunity cost,
(￿1 ￿ ￿￿2)B, in the future.
Finally, since as c ! 0 then (
~ A
^ A)￿ ! 0; by (15b) it is also immediate to note that:37
Corollary 2
When c = 0 the impact of the Government conservation policies on the long-run deforestation rate
vanishes. The long-run deforestation rate depends only on the dynamic of B (i.e. ￿; ￿2); and the economic
pro￿tability of land development (i.e. ￿):
This result makes sense. Since land development comes at no cost (i.e. the conversion opportunity
cost results extremely low), and it is, depending on the level of B, pro￿table over a vast land surface the
Government policies are completely neutralized in the long-run.
36We show in appendix A.5 that to a higher ￿ corresponds a higher probability of hitting ^ ￿ and thus a higher long run average
deforestation rate.
37Comparable results are obtained by Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 372-373) and Hartman and Hendrickson (2002) when
deriving the long-run average growth rate of investment.
166 The Costa Rica case study
In this section we provide a numerical exercise to illustrate our ￿ndings. We calibrate the model to ￿t
the characteristics of the Area de Conservaci￿n Tortuguero (ACTo).38 This is a territorial unit which
covers about 355375 hectares by including the cantones of Guacimo and Pococi, a portion of the canton of
Sarapiqui and the province of Limon. In administrative terms, the ACTo is the regional o¢ ce of the Sistema
Nacional de `reas de Conservaci￿n (SINAC), a public body in charge for the sustainable exploitation of
forest resources and the conservation of national natural forests. Currently, as reported by Calvo (2008, p.
11), 148000 hectares of the total surface are still forested39 while in the remainder, i.e. 207375 hectares,
economic activities, such as agriculture, ranching and forestry, have been undertaken.
In our calculations, we set the following values for the parameters:
1. The extent of the original forested area, F, is 355375 hectares. The currently converted portion is
equal to A0 = 207375 hectares.40 We assume that the government allows the development of the 50%
of the remaining land, i.e. 74000 hectares. This implies that forest conversion should be halted at
A = 281375.
2. The annual value of ES, ~ B, is equal to $75=ha when we only account for the forest production function,
i.e. sustainable exploitation of timber and non-timber forest products and sustainable ecotourism.
Otherwise, to include regulatory and habitat functions, we set it equal to $200=ha.41 To study the
impact of its trend and volatility on forest conversion dynamics, we let ￿ take values 0, 0:025, and
0:05 and let ￿ vary within the interval [0; 0:35].
3. The ACTo belongs to the Atlantic zone of Costa Rica targeted by Bulte et al. (2002). Consistently,
in order to draw our demand for agricultural products, we borrow from their study the estimated
parameters, ￿ = $6990062 (in 1998 US$) and ￿ = 0:887.
4. A 7% risk free interest rate is assumed (r = 0:07). Finally, to capture the e⁄ect of conversion costs
on deforestation and land conversion runs we will consider di⁄erent levels of costly deforestation,
c = [0;500;1500].42
In the following, we ￿rst present an analysis of ￿rst-best conversion dynamics. Then, once discussed the
e⁄ect of relevant parameters, we illustrate the implications of second-best policies on optimal forest stocks
and deforestation rates under di⁄erent scenarios. In the tables below we provide the optimal forest stock
which should be held, ￿ A ￿ ~ A, and the average deforestation rate at which such stock should be optimally
exhausted in the long-run. Note that in our calculations the deforestation rate may be null in two cases.
First, trivially, when the optimal forest stock, ￿ A￿ ~ A; is completely exhausted and second, when the expected
￿ uctuation of B induces inertia, i.e. ￿ ￿ 1
2￿2. We will distinguish between them using 0 for the former and
a dash for the latter.
6.1 Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under ￿rst-
best policy
Suppose for the moment that the social planner may count on the total pristine forested surface of 355375
hectares and that the ceiling on forest conversion is A = 281375. As shown above, the ￿rst-best optimal
conversion policy can be easily obtained by setting ￿1 = 1 and ￿ = 0 (￿ = 1). By plugging the assumed level
for ~ B in equation (10) we determine the corresponding optimal converted land surface, ~ A = A( ~ B), and by
subtracting it from ￿ A, the optimal forest stock. The long-run rate at which such stock should be exploited
is instead determined by plugging ~ A into (15b).
Results in tables 2 and 3 con￿rms the comparative statics previously presented. As expected, higher
conversion costs induce larger optimal forest stocks and lower long-run average deforestation rates. We
38Further details are available at http://www.acto.go.cr/general_info.php and http://www.sinac.go.cr/areassilvestres.php.
39The total forested area includes 100000 hectares under protection and 48000 hectares without.
40We simply subtract from 355375 hectares the surface of 148000 hectares that, up to Calvo (2008, p. 11), is still forested.
41See Bulte et al. (2002, pp. 154-155) .
42Bulte et al. (2002) and Leroux et al. (2009) use c = 0 assuming that the revenue from timber sales o⁄sets the clearing
costs.
17observe the same e⁄ect for higher level of ~ B: This is not surprising since the opportunity cost of conversion
increases with ~ B.
Table 2: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under ￿rst-best with c = 0
We observe that the optimal forest stock is increasing in both expected trend, ￿, and volatility, ￿; of the
level of payments for ES. The insight behind this result is standard in the real option literature. Since with
higher ￿ and/or ￿ development is induced by lower levels of B then conversion is postponed and the optimal
converted surface corresponding to a given ~ B must be lower. We note that for high level of ￿ and ￿, the
forest stock should be almost intact. Long-run average rate of deforestation are null for ￿ ￿ 1
2￿2. For this
range of values, the expected trend, ￿, is in fact strong enough to take the level of B far from the conversion
barrier. For ￿ < 1
2￿2 the deforestation rate is decreasing in ￿ and increasing in ￿. As discussed above this
depends on the di⁄erent sign of the impact that changes in these parameters have on the regulated process
18￿ and the upper re￿ ecting barrier ^ ￿.
Table 3: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under ￿rst-best with c = 500
By comparing the picture drawn by our tables and the available data, it is immediate to realize that the
level of currently conserved land is in the most part of cases well below the optimal levels. We note that
only for ~ B = 75 and with low levels of ￿ and ￿ the current forest stock is in line or above the optimal levels.
This implies that, on average, the past deforestation rates have been considerably higher than the optimal
ones.
Thus, on the basis of these considerations, the crucial question becomes: given that 207375 hectares have
been developed then how long it takes to clear the targeted surface A = 281375? We answer this question
by taking a di⁄erent perspective. In the previous section given a certain ~ B we computed the optimal forest
stock and the associated deforestation rate. Here, on the contrary, we establish a common initial converted
land surface, A0 = 207375, and calculate the long-run average deforestation rate and the relative expected
time of total conversion for di⁄erent levels of ￿; ￿ and c.
In table 4 we observe that the expected time required for exhausting the forest stock decreases with
uncertainty. This result can be easily explained addressing the reader to the relationship between average
deforestation rate and volatility previously discussed. This e⁄ect is partially balanced by higher conversion
cost and higher expected growth in the payments for ES. In terms of delayed conversion, the e⁄ect of ￿ is
more remarkable. In fact, note that with low uncertainty (￿ 2 [0;0:1]) it is possible to deter conversion, even
19if costless (c = 0), by simply guaranteeing a higher expected growth in the payments (see ￿gure 8).43
Table 4: Long-run deforestation rates and timing with c = 0 and c = 500
43Our ￿ndings seem in contrast with the calibration used in Leroux et al. (2009) where the authors assume a deforestation
rate equal to 2:5 with ￿ = 0:05 and ￿ = 0:1. In fact, we show that for those values the deforestation rate should be null. A
2:5% deforestation rate would be justi￿ed only for lower ￿ and higher ￿:
20Figure 8: Di⁄erence in expected time for total conversion between c = 500 and c = 0
with ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0:025.
6.2 Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under second-
best policy
In this section, we focus on the implications of a second-best approach to conservation policies. Our analysis
will consider three main scenarios (see table 5). In the ￿rst one, we will highlight the impact on conservation
of a reduction in the compensation for ES provision (scenario 1) while in scenarios 2 and 3 we will study the
role of compensation for a restriction on land development.44 We will not discuss the e⁄ect of parameters
e B; ￿; ￿ and c since they are perfectly in line with the analysis under ￿rst-best. We will rather concentrate
on the peculiar characteristics of second-best conservation policies.
Table 5: Policy scenarios
Table 6 illustrates the dramatic impact of conversion run occurring when the ceiling on forest conservation is
binding ( ￿ A < ^ A).45 By comparing scenarios 1 and 3 with the ￿rst-best outcome the forest stock is sensibly
lower. The e⁄ect is particularly drastic for ￿ = 0 where the forest stock would be totally exhausted. On the
contrary, under scenario 2 the second-best policy is more conservative than the ￿rst-best one. This is not
surprising since in this case the policy imposes no compensation on the portion set aside when developing
(￿2 = 0). Note that such a policy is substantially similar to an uncompensated taking even if, di⁄erently
from a taking, its provisions are accepted on a voluntary basis by signing the initial conservation contract.
Interestingly, under scenario 3 the forest stock is larger than under scenario 1. In this case, even if there is
a compensation for the portion set aside the restriction on land development deters conversion. We observe
44Numerical results under other scenarios are available upon request.
45Tables illustrating scenarios with land conversion run for e B = 200 and without land conversion run ( ￿ A ￿ ^ A) are available
in the appendix.
21that for ￿ > 0 deforestation would proceed at a relatively low speed under each scenario, at least up to the
level A+ where due to the conversion run the remaining forest stock is instantaneously exhausted.
Table 6: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under second-best with c = 500
Let conclude by highlighting through ￿gures 9 and 10 the role played by the conversion cost, c. Under
each policy scenario we determine (for e B = 75; ￿ = 0:025 and ￿ 2 [0;0:35]); the ￿rst-best surface of land
developed, ~ A, and the surface, A+, triggering a conversion run. Then we plot the di⁄erence ~ A ￿ A+. By
comparing ￿gure 9 and 10, the lower is c the more remarkable is the impact of the land conversion run.
In other words, under both scenarios 1 and 3, ~ A > A+ over the entire range of ￿ which means that in
those scenarios a conversion run, started well before having reached ~ A, would have completely exhausted
the forest stock by clearing land up to the ceiling ￿ A: The impact of lower conversion costs should then be
taken seriously into account since, as shown, for c ! 0 landowners would rush even for expected payments
22growing at a positive rate.
Figure 9: ~ A ￿ A+ for ~ B = 75; ￿ = 0:025 and c = 0.
Figure 10: ~ A ￿ A+ for ~ B = 75; ￿ = 0:025 and c = 500.
237 Conclusions
In this paper we contribute to the vast literature on optimal land allocation under uncertainty and irre-
versible development. We extend previous work in three respects. First, departing from the standard central
planner perspective we investigate the role that competing farming may have on conversion dynamics. Under
competition, decreasing pro￿ts from agriculture may discourage conversion in particular if society is willing
to reward habitat conservation as land use. Second, in this decentralized framework, we look at the conserva-
tion e⁄ort that Government land policy, through a combination of voluntary and command approaches, may
stimulate. In this regard, an interesting result is represented by the considerable amount of conservation that
the Government can induce by partially compensating agents for the ES provided. By comparing ￿rst-best
and second-best conversion policies, we study the impact that di⁄erent combinations of policy parameters
may have on the expected conversion speed. Then, we show how the conservation payment schedule must
be designed to limit the impact of set-aside requirements.
In addition, we show that the existence of a ceiling for the stock of developable land may produce perverse
e⁄ects on conversion dynamics by activating a run which instantaneously exhausts the stock. Third, we
believe that time matters when dynamic land allocation is analysed. Hence, we suggest the use of the
optimal long-run average expected rate of conversion to assess the temporal performance of conservation
policy and we show its utility by running several numerical simulations based on realistic policy scenarios.
24A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium
The value function of a farmer is given by:
V (A;B; ￿ A) = Z2(A)B￿2 +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
r




Since each agent rationally forecasts the future dynamics of the market for agricultural goods at B￿(A)





A￿￿ + (￿￿2 ￿ ￿1)
B￿(A)
r ￿ ￿
= (1 ￿ ￿)c (A.1.2)
In addition, the following conditions must hold (see e.g. Proposition 1 in Bartolini (1993) and Grenadier
(2002, p. 699)):
VA(A;B￿(A); ￿ A) = Z0
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Finally, considering the limit on conversion, ￿ A; imposed by the Government it follows that:
Z2( ￿ A) = 0 (A.1.5)
Condition (A.1.4) illustrates two scenarios. In the ￿rst one, each landholder exercises the option to convert
at the level of B￿(A) where the value, V (A;B￿(A); ￿ A) is tangent to the conversion cost, (1 ￿ ￿)c.46 That




r￿￿ = 0. It is easy to verify that, as conjectured, Z2(A) < 0.
In the case V (A,B￿(A); ￿ A) is smooth at the conversion threshold and B￿(A) is a continuous function of




dA = 0. This implies that the landholder may bene￿t from marginally anticipating or delaying the
conversion decision. In particular, if VB(A,B￿(A); ￿ A) < 0 then the value of conversion is expected to increase
as B drops. Conversely, if VB(A,B￿(A); ￿ A) > 0 then losses must be expected as B drops. However, in both

















r￿￿ < 0, then (A.1.6) cannot hold at A = ￿ A. Therefore, (A.1.7) must hold at
A = ￿ A and by (A.1.2) it follows that:







c for A+ ￿ A ￿ ￿ A (A.1.8)
where ^ A = ( ￿
rc)1=￿ represents the last parcel conversion which makes economic sense. In fact, note that since
(￿￿2 ￿ ￿1) B
r￿￿ < 0 then ￿
rA￿￿ ￿ c for A ￿ ^ A.
46This condition holds at any re￿ecting barrier without any optimization being involved (Dixit, 1993).
25Now let￿ s de￿ne A+ as the largest A ￿ ￿ A that satis￿es (A.1.6). This implies that for all the landholders
in the range A+ ￿ A ￿ ￿ A, we have
dB
￿(A)
dA = 0 and conversion takes place at B￿( ￿ A). Over the range A < A+











c for A < A+ (A.1.9)

























The conversion policy is summarized by (A.1.8) and (A.1.9). The conversion policy should be smooth until
the surface A+ < ￿ A has been converted. At A+ landholders rush and a run takes place to convert the residual
land before the limit imposed by the Government is met. By (A.1.9), B￿(A) is decreasing with respect to A.
This makes sense since further land conversion reduces the pro￿t from agriculture and a landholder would
convert land only if she/he expects a future reduction in B.











)￿ ￿ 1 (A.1.10 bis)
Studying (A.1.10 bis) we can state that since
￿2
￿2￿1 > 0:
- if ^ A ￿ ￿ A then it must be ￿ A ￿ A+. This implies that there is no run taking place. Land will be converted
smoothly according to (A.1.8) up to ^ A since ￿
rA￿￿ ￿ c for A ￿ ^ A;
- if ^ A > ￿ A then it must be A+ < ￿ A. In this case, land is converted smoothly up to A+ where landholders
start a run to convert land up to ￿ A.
A.2 Value of the option to convert
In this appendix we show that, by competition, the value of the opportunity to develop the plot by the single
farmer is null at the conversion threshold. The value of the option to convert, F(A,B; ￿ A), is the solution of
the following di⁄erential equation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, ch. 8):
1
2
￿2B2FBB(A;B; ￿ A) + ￿BFB(A;B; ￿ A) ￿ rF(A;B; ￿ A) = 0 for B > BC(A) (A.2.1)
where BC(A) is the optimal threshold for conversion. Note that this is an ordinary di⁄erential equation, the
general solution of which can be written as:
F(A;B; ￿ A) = C1(A)B￿1 + C2(A)B￿2 (A.2.2)
where 1 < ￿1 < r=￿, ￿2 < 0 are the positive and the negative root of the characteristic equation ￿(￿) =
1
2￿2￿(￿ ￿ 1) + ￿￿ ￿ r = 0, and C1, C2 are two constants to be determined.
Since ￿1 ￿ ￿2 then as B increases, the value of the option to convert should vanish (limB!1 F(A;B; ￿ A) =
0). This implies that C1 = 0. Now, let￿ s determine the optimal conversion threshold BC(A) and the constant
C1(A). We attach to the di⁄erential equation above the following value matching and the smooth pasting
conditions:
F(A;BC(A); ￿ A) = V (A;BC(A); ￿ A) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c (A.2.3)






￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c
26FB(A;BC(A); ￿ A) = VB(A;BC(A); ￿ A) (A.2.4)























Rearranging (A.2.4) and substituting we have:








(BC(A)1￿￿2 ￿ B￿(A)1￿￿2) = 0
As expected the value of the option to convert is null at BC(A) = B￿(A).
A.3 Long-run distributions
Let h be a linear Brownian motion with parameters ￿ and ￿ that evolves according to dh = ￿dt + ￿dw.
Following Harrison (1985, pp. 90-91; see also Dixit 1993, pp. 58-68) the long-run density function for h
￿ uctuating between a lower re￿ ecting barrier, a 2 (￿1;1), and an upper re￿ ecting barrier, b 2 (￿1;1),















￿2 a ￿ 6= 0;
1
b￿a ￿ = 0:
(A.3.1)







￿2 (b￿h) ￿ > 0;
0 ￿ ￿ 0:
for ￿ 1 < h < b (A.3.2)
Hence, the long-run average of h can be evaluated as E [h] =
R
￿ hf (h)dh, where ￿ depends on the distrib-






















￿2 hdh = b ￿
2￿
￿2 (A.3.3)
A.4 Long-run average growth rate of deforestation



















+ ln[J ￿ B]
where J=
￿2
￿2￿1 (r ￿ ￿)￿
PA(A)
r and J > B. Rewriting ln[J ￿ B] as ln
￿
elnJ ￿ elnB￿
and expanding it by
Taylor￿ s theorem around the point (g lnJ; g lnB) yields:












g lnB￿g lnJ +
g lnB





g lnB￿g lnJ ; v2 =
1











+ v0 + v1 lnJ + v2 lnB (A.4.2)
Now, by Ito￿ s lemma and the considerations discussed in the paper on the competitive equilibrium, ln￿
evolves according to dln￿ = v2dlnB = v2[(￿ ￿ 1
2￿2)dt + ￿dw] with ln^ ￿ as upper re￿ ecting barrier. Setting
h = ln￿, the random variable ln￿ follows a linear Brownian motion with parameter ￿ = v2(￿ ￿ 1
2￿2) > 0
and has a long-run distribution with (A.3.2) as density function.







+ v0 + v1 ln
h
￿2
￿2￿1 (r ￿ ￿)￿￿
r
i
+ v2 lnB ￿ h
￿v1
(A.4.3)
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28By the monotonicity property of the logarithm, e B must exists such that ln e B = g lnB. Furthermore, by
plugging e B into (10), we can always ￿nd a surface ~ A and e J =
￿2
￿2￿1 (r ￿ ￿)￿
PA( ~ A)
r such that a linearization
along (g lnB; g lnJ) is equivalent to a linearization along (ln e B;ln e J), where g lnJ = ln e J. This implies that by
setting ( e B; ~ A), the long-run average rate of deforestation can be written as:
1
dt




































￿2￿1(r￿￿)￿ + c and ~ A < ^ A.
A.5 The impact of uncertainty on the distribution of ￿
Rearranging (A.4.2) yields
ln￿ ’ U￿ + v2 lnB (A.5.1)
where U￿ = ln
￿1￿￿￿2
r￿￿ + v0 + v1 lnJ:
By some manipulations:
eln￿ = eU￿+v2 lnB
￿ = eU￿Bv2 (A.5.2)


























Calculating ￿rst, second moment and variance for ￿ we obtain:
















Note that since ￿ + 1
2(v2 ￿ 1)￿2 < 0 and v2 < 0 then E(￿) is increasing in t. Finally, by deriving V ar(￿)



















That is, as ￿ soars V ar(￿) increases and so does the probability of hitting ^ ￿ which in turn implies an increase
in the long run average deforestation rate.
29A.6 Additional tables
With land conversion run
Table 7: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under second-best with e B = 200 and c = 500
30No Rush
Table 8: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under second-best with e B = 75 and c = 1500
31Without land conversion run
Table 9: Optimal forest stock and long-run average rate of deforestation under second-best with e B = 200 and c = 1500
32References
[1] Adler, J.H., 2008. Money or nothing: the adverse environmental consequences of uncompensated land-
use controls. Boston College Law Review, 49, 2, 301-366.
[2] Alston, L.J., Mueller, B., 2007. Legal reserve requirements in Brazilian forests: path dependent evolution
of de facto legislation. ANPEC Revista Economia, 8, 4, 25-53.
[3] Arrow, K.J., Fisher, A.C., 1974. Environmental preservation, uncertainty, and irreversibility. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 88, 312-319.
[4] Bartolini L., 1993. Competitive runs, the case of a ceiling on aggregate investment. European Economic
Review, 37, 921-948.
[5] Baldursson, F. M., 1998. Irreversible investment under uncertainty in oligopoly. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 22, 627-644.
[6] Bentolila, S., Bertola, G., 1990. Firing costs and labour demand: how bad is eurosclerosis? Review of
Economic Studies, 57, 3, 381-402.
[7] Bulte, E., van Soest, D.P., van Kooten, G.C., and R.A., Schipper, 2002. Forest conservation in Costa
Rica when nonuse bene￿ts are uncertain but rising. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 84,
1, 150-160.
[8] Barbier, E.B., Burgess, J.C. (eds), 2001. Tropical Deforestation and Land Use. Land Economics, 77, 2,
155-314.
[9] Caballero, R., Pindyck, R.S., 1992. Uncertainty, investment and industry Evolution. NBER working
Paper no. 4160.
[10] Clarke, H.R., Reed, W.J., 1989. The tree-cutting problem in a stochastic environment. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 13, 569-595.
[11] Calvo, J., 2009. Bosque, cobertura y recursos forestales 2008. Ponencia preparada para el Dec-
imoquinto Informe Estado de la Naci￿n. San JosØ, Programa Estado de la Naci￿n. Avail-
able at http://www.estadonacion.or.cr/images/stories/informes/015/docs/Armonia/Calvo_2009.pdf.
Accessed 24 October 2011.
[12] Conrad, J.M., 1980. Quasi-option value and the expected value of information. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 95, 813-820.
[13] Conrad, J.M., 1997. On the option value of old-growth forest. Ecological Economics, 22, 97-102.
[14] Conrad, J.M., 2000. Wilderness: options to preserve, extract, or develop. Resource and Energy Eco-
nomics, 22, 3, 205-219.
[15] Cox, J.C., Ross, S.A., 1976. The valuation of options for alternative stochastic process. Econometrica,
53, 385￿ 408.
[16] Di Corato, L., Moretto, M., and S. Vergalli, 2010. An equilibrium model of habitat conservation under
uncertainty and irreversibility. FEEM Nota di Lavoro 160.2010.
[17] Dixit, A., 1989. Entry and exit decisions under uncertainty. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 620￿ 638.
[18] Dixit, A., 1993. The Art of Smooth Pasting. Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers.
[19] Dixit, A., Pindyck, R.S., 1994. Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton (NJ), Princeton University
Press.
[20] Dosi, C., Moretto, M. 1997. Pollution accumulation and ￿rm incentives to promote irreversible techno-
logical change under uncertain private bene￿ts. Environmental and Resource Economics, 10, 285-300.
33[21] Engel, S., Pagiola, S., and S. Wunder, 2008. Designing payments for environmental services in theory
and practice: an overview of the issues. Ecological Economics, 65, 663￿ 674.
[22] Ferraro, P.J., 2001. Global habitat protection: limitations of development interventions and a role for
conservation performance payments. Conservation Biology, 15, 990-1000.
[23] Ferraro, P.J., Kiss, A., 2002. Direct payments to conserve biodiversity. Science, 298, 1718-1719.
[24] Ferraro, P.J., Simpson, R.D., 2002. The cost-e⁄ectiveness of conservation payments. Land Economics,
78, 3, 339-353.
[25] Ferraro, P.J., Simpson, R.D., 2005. Protecting forests and biodiversity: are investments in eco-friendly
production activities the best way to protect endangered ecosystems and enhance rural livelihoods?
Forests, Trees and Livelihoods, 15, 167-181.
[26] Ferraro, P.J., Pattanayak, S., 2006. Money for nothing? A call for empirical evaluation of biodiversity
conservation investments. PLoS Biol 4(4): e105. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0040105.
[27] Ferraro, P.J., 2008. Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental ser-
vices. Ecological Economics, 65, 4, 810-821.
[28] Folke, C., Holling, C.S., and C. Perrings, 1996. Biological Diversity, Ecosystems, and the Human Scale.
Ecological Applications, 6, 4, 1018-1024
[29] FONAFIFO, 2007. Manual de Procedimientos para el pago de Servicios Ambientales. Gaceta, 51,
13/03/2007. http://www.fona￿fo.com/text_￿les/servicios_ambientales/Manuales/MPPSA_2007.pdf
[30] Gregersen, H., El Lakany, H., Karsenty, A., and A. White, 2010. Does the Opportunity Cost Approach
Indicate the Real Cost of REDD+? Rights and Realities of Paying for REDD+, Rights and Resources
Initiative, Washington, DC.
[31] Grenadier, S.R., 2002. Option exercise games: an application to the equilibrium investment strategies
of ￿rms. Review of Financial Studies, 15, 691-721.
[32] Hansen, A.J., Rotella, J.J., 2002. Biophysical factors, land use, and species viability in and around
nature reserves. Conservation Biology, 16, 4, 1112￿ 1122.
[33] Hansen, A.J., DeFries, R., 2007. Ecological mechanisms linking protected areas to surrounding lands.
Ecological Applications, 17, 4, 974￿ 988.
[34] Harrison, J.M., 1985, Brownian Motion and Stochastic Flow Systems. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
[35] Hartman R., Hendrickson M., 2002. Optimal Partially Reversible Investment. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 26, 483￿ 508.
[36] Henry, C., 1974. Investment decisions under uncertainty: the "Irreversibility E⁄ect". American Eco-
nomic Review, 64, 6, 1006-1012.




[40] Isik, M., Yang, W., 2004. An analysis of the e⁄ects of uncertainty and irreversibility on farmer partic-
ipation in the conservation reserve program. Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 29, 2,
242￿ 259.
[41] Jovanovic, B., 1982. Selection and the evolution of industry. Econometrica, 50, 649￿ 670.
34[42] Kassar, I., Lasserre, P., 2004. Species preservation and biodiversity value: a real options approach.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 48, 2, 857-879.
[43] Lambson, V.E., 1992. Competitive pro￿ts in the long run. Review of Economic Studies, 59, 125￿ 142.
[44] Langpap, C., Wu, J., 2004. Voluntary conservation of endangered species: when does no regulatory
assurance mean no conservation? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 47, 435￿ 457.
[45] Leroux, A.D., Martin, V.L. and T. Goesch, 2009. Optimal conservation, extinction debt,and the aug-
mented quasi-option value. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 58, 43￿ 57.
[46] Lucas, R.E. Jr, Prescott, E.C., 1971. Investment under uncertainty. Econometrica, 39, 659-681.
[47] M￿stad, O., 2001. Timber trade restrictions and tropical deforestation: a forest mining approach.
Resource and Energy Economics, 23, 2, 111-132
[48] Moretto, M., 2008. Competition and irreversible investment under uncertainty. Information Economics
and Policy, 20, 1, 75-88.
[49] Pagiola, S., 2008. Payments for environmental services in Costa Rica. Ecological Economics, 65, 4,
712￿ 724.
[50] Pattanayak, S., Wunder, S., and P.J. Ferraro, 2010. Show Me the Money: Do Payments Supply En-
vironmental Services in Developing Countries? Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 4, 2,
254-274.
[51] Pearce, D., F. Putz, and J. K. Vanclay, 1999. A sustainable forest future. Working Paper GEC 99-15,
CSERGE, London.
[52] Perrings, C., Pearce, D., 1994. Threshold e⁄ects and incentives for conservation of biodiversity. Envi-
ronmental and Resource Economics, 4, 13-28.
[53] Productivity Commission, 2004. Impacts of native vegetation and biodiversity regulations. Productivity
Commission Working Paper No. 29. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=600970
[54] Reed, W.J., 1993. The decision to conserve or harvest old-growth forest. Ecological Economics, 8, 45-69.
[55] Segerson, K., Miceli, T.J., 1998. Voluntary environmental agreements: good or bad news for environ-
mental protection. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36, 109￿ 130.
[56] Sierra, R., Russman, E., 2006. On the e¢ ciency of environmental service payments: a forest conservation
assessment in the Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica. Ecological Economics, 59, 131￿ 141.
[57] Smith, R.B.W., Shogren, J.F., 2002. Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 43, 169￿ 187.
[58] Stavins, R.N., Ja⁄e, A.B., 1990. Unintended impacts of public investments on private decisions: the
depletion of forested wetlands. American Economic Review, 80, 3, 337-352.
[59] Tisdell, C.A., 1995, Issues in biodiversity conservation including the role of local communities. Environ-
mental Conservation, 22, 216-222.
[60] Wells, M., Brandon, K.E., and L., Hannsh, 1992, People and parks: linking procteded area management
with local communities. The World Bank, WWF, and USAID, Washington , D.C.
[61] Wunder, S., Engel, S., and S., Pagiola, 2008. Taking stock: a comparative analysis of payments for
environmental services programs in developed and developing countries. Ecological Economics, 65, 834-
853.
[62] Wunder, S. 2005. Payments for environmental services: some nuts and bolts. CIFOR Occasional paper
42. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.
35NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 











NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2011 
SD  1.2011  Anna Alberini, Will Gans and Daniel Velez-Lopez: Residential Consumption of Gas and Electricity in the U.S.: 
The Role of Prices and Income 
SD  2.2011  Alexander Golub, Daiju Narita and Matthias G.W. Schmidt: Uncertainty in Integrated Assessment Models of 
Climate Change: Alternative Analytical Approaches 
SD  3.2010  Reyer Gerlagh and Nicole A. Mathys: Energy Abundance, Trade and Industry Location 
SD  4.2010  Melania Michetti and Renato Nunes Rosa: Afforestation and Timber Management Compliance Strategies in 
Climate Policy. A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis 
SD  5.2011  Hassan Benchekroun and Amrita Ray Chaudhuri: “The Voracity Effect” and Climate Change: The Impact of 
Clean Technologies 
IM  6.2011  Sergio Mariotti, Marco Mutinelli, Marcella Nicolini and Lucia Piscitello: Productivity Spillovers from Foreign 
MNEs on Domestic Manufacturing Firms: Is Co-location Always a Plus? 
GC  7.2011  Marco Percoco: The Fight Against Geography: Malaria and Economic Development in Italian Regions 
GC  8.2011  Bin Dong and Benno Torgler: Democracy, Property Rights, Income Equality, and Corruption 
GC  9.2011  Bin Dong and Benno Torgler: Corruption and Social Interaction: Evidence from China 
SD 10.2011  Elisa Lanzi, Elena Verdolini and Ivan Haščič: Efficiency Improving Fossil Fuel Technologies for Electricity 
Generation: Data Selection and Trends 
SD  11.2011  Stergios Athanassoglou: Efficiency under a Combination of Ordinal and Cardinal Information on Preferences
SD  12.2011  Robin Cross, Andrew J. Plantinga and Robert N. Stavins: The Value of Terroir: Hedonic Estimation of 
Vineyard Sale Prices 
SD  13.2011  Charles F. Mason and Andrew J. Plantinga: Contracting for Impure Public Goods: Carbon Offsets and 
Additionality 
SD  14.2011  Alain Ayong Le Kama, Aude Pommeret and Fabien Prieur: Optimal Emission Policy under the Risk of 
Irreversible Pollution 
SD  15.2011  Philippe Quirion, Julie Rozenberg, Olivier Sassi and Adrien Vogt-Schilb: How CO2 Capture and Storage Can 
Mitigate Carbon Leakage 
SD  16.2011  Carlo Carraro and Emanuele Massetti: Energy and Climate Change in China 
SD  17.2011  ZhongXiang Zhang: Effective Environmental Protection in the Context of Government Decentralization 
SD  18.2011  Stergios Athanassoglou and Anastasios Xepapadeas: Pollution Control with Uncertain Stock Dynamics: 
When, and How, to be Precautious 
SD 19.2011  Jūratė Jaraitė and Corrado Di Maria: Efficiency, Productivity and Environmental Policy: A Case Study of 
Power Generation in the EU 
SD  20.2011  Giulio Cainelli, Massimiliano Mozzanti and Sandro Montresor: Environmental Innovations, Local Networks 
and Internationalization 
SD  21.2011  Gérard Mondello: Hazardous Activities and Civil Strict Liability: The Regulator’s Dilemma 
SD  22.2011  Haiyan Xu and ZhongXiang Zhang: A Trend Deduction Model of Fluctuating Oil Prices 
SD  23.2011  Athanasios Lapatinas, Anastasia Litina and Eftichios S. Sartzetakis: Corruption and Environmental Policy: 
An Alternative Perspective 
SD  24.2011  Emanuele Massetti: A Tale of Two Countries:Emissions Scenarios for China and India 
SD  25.2011  Xavier Pautrel: Abatement Technology and the Environment-Growth Nexus with Education 
SD  26.2011  Dionysis Latinopoulos and Eftichios Sartzetakis: Optimal Exploitation of Groundwater and the Potential for 
a Tradable Permit System in Irrigated Agriculture 
SD  27.2011  Benno Torgler and Marco Piatti. A Century of American Economic Review 
SD  28.2011  Stergios Athanassoglou, Glenn Sheriff, Tobias Siegfried and Woonghee Tim Huh: Optimal Mechanisms for 
Heterogeneous Multi-cell Aquifers 
SD  29.2011  Libo Wu, Jing Li and ZhongXiang Zhang: Inflationary Effect of Oil-Price Shocks in an Imperfect Market: A 
Partial Transmission Input-output Analysis  
SD  30.2011  Junko Mochizuki and ZhongXiang Zhang: Environmental Security and its Implications for China’s Foreign 
Relations 
SD  31.2011  Teng Fei, He Jiankun, Pan Xunzhang and Zhang Chi: How to Measure Carbon Equity: Carbon Gini Index 
Based on Historical Cumulative Emission Per Capita 
SD  32.2011  Dirk Rübbelke and Pia Weiss: Environmental Regulations, Market Structure and Technological Progress in 
Renewable Energy Technology — A Panel Data Study on Wind Turbines 
SD  33.2011  Nicola Doni and Giorgio Ricchiuti: Market Equilibrium in the Presence of Green Consumers and Responsible 
Firms: a Comparative Statics Analysis SD  34.2011  Gérard Mondello: Civil Liability, Safety and Nuclear Parks: Is Concentrated Management Better? 
SD  35.2011  Walid Marrouch and Amrita Ray Chaudhuri: International Environmental Agreements in the Presence of 
Adaptation 
ERM  36.2011  Will Gans, Anna Alberini and Alberto Longo: Smart Meter Devices and The Effect of Feedback on Residential 
Electricity Consumption: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Northern Ireland 
ERM  37.2011  William K. Jaeger and Thorsten M. Egelkraut: Biofuel Economics in a Setting of Multiple Objectives & 
Unintended Consequences 
CCSD  38.2011  Kyriaki Remoundou, Fikret Adaman, Phoebe Koundouri and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes: Are Preferences for 
Environmental Quality Sensitive to Financial Funding Schemes? Evidence from a Marine Restoration 
Programme in the Black Sea 
CCSD  39.2011  Andrea Ghermanti and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes: A Global Map of Costal Recreation Values: Results From a 
Spatially Explicit Based Meta-Analysis 
CCSD  40.2011  Andries Richter, Anne Maria Eikeset, Daan van Soest, and Nils Chr. Stenseth: Towards the Optimal 
Management of the Northeast Arctic Cod Fishery 
CCSD  41.2011  Florian M. Biermann: A Measure to Compare Matchings in Marriage Markets 
CCSD  42.2011  Timo Hiller: Alliance Formation and Coercion in Networks 
CCSD  43.2011  Sunghoon Hong: Strategic Network Interdiction 
CCSD 44.2011  Arnold  Polanski  and Emiliya A. Lazarova: Dynamic Multilateral Markets 
CCSD  45.2011  Marco Mantovani, Georg Kirchsteiger, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch: Myopic or Farsighted? An 
Experiment on Network Formation 
CCSD  46.2011  Rémy Oddou: The Effect of Spillovers and Congestion on the Segregative Properties of Endogenous 
Jurisdiction Structure Formation 
CCSD  47.2011  Emanuele Massetti and Elena Claire Ricci: Super-Grids and Concentrated Solar Power: A Scenario Analysis 
with the WITCH Model 
ERM  48.2011  Matthias Kalkuhl, Ottmar Edenhofer and Kai Lessmann: Renewable Energy Subsidies: Second-Best Policy or 
Fatal Aberration for Mitigation? 
CCSD  49.2011  ZhongXiang Zhang: Breaking the Impasse in International Climate Negotiations: A New Direction for 
Currently Flawed Negotiations and a Roadmap for China to 2050 
CCSD  50.2011  Emanuele Massetti and Robert Mendelsohn: Estimating Ricardian Models With Panel Data 
CCSD  51.2011  Y. Hossein Farzin and Kelly A. Grogan: Socioeconomic Factors and Water Quality in California 
CCSD  52.2011  Dinko Dimitrov and Shao Chin Sung: Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games 
ES  53.2011  Giovanni Mastrobuoni and Paolo Pinotti: Migration Restrictions and Criminal Behavior: Evidence from a 
Natural Experiment 
ERM  54.2011  Alessandro Cologni and Matteo Manera: On the Economic Determinants of Oil Production. Theoretical 
Analysis and Empirical Evidence for Small Exporting Countries 
ERM  55.2011  Alessandro Cologni and Matteo Manera: Exogenous Oil Shocks, Fiscal Policy and Sector Reallocations in Oil 
Producing Countries 
ERM  56.2011  Morgan Bazilian, Patrick Nussbaumer, Giorgio Gualberti, Erik Haites, Michael Levi, Judy Siegel, Daniel M. 
Kammen and Joergen Fenhann: Informing the Financing of Universal Energy Access: An Assessment of 
Current Flows 
CCSD  57.2011  Carlo Orecchia and Maria Elisabetta Tessitore: Economic Growth and the Environment with Clean and Dirty 
Consumption 
ERM  58.2011  Wan-Jung Chou, Andrea Bigano, Alistair Hunt, Stephane La Branche, Anil Markandya and Roberta 
Pierfederici: Households’ WTP for the Reliability of Gas Supply 
ES  59.2011  Maria Comune, Alireza Naghavi and Giovanni Prarolo: Intellectual Property Rights and South-North 
Formation of Global Innovation Networks 
ES  60.2011  Alireza Naghavi and Chiara Strozzi: Intellectual Property Rights, Migration, and Diaspora 
CCSD  61.2011  Massimo Tavoni, Shoibal Chakravarty and Robert Socolow: Safe vs. Fair: A Formidable Trade-off in Tackling 
Climate Change 
CCSD  62.2011  Donatella Baiardi, Matteo Manera and Mario Menegatti: Consumption and Precautionary Saving: An 
Empirical Analysis under Both Financial and Environmental Risks 
ERM  63.2011  Caterina Gennaioli and Massimo Tavoni: Clean or “Dirty” Energy: Evidence on a Renewable Energy Resource 
Curse 
ES  64.2011  Angelo Antoci and Luca Zarri: Punish and Perish? 
ES  65.2011  Anders Akerman, Anna Larsson and Alireza Naghavi: Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A 
Tale of Two Elites 
CCSD  66.2011  Valentina Bosetti and Jeffrey Frankel: Sustainable Cooperation in Global Climate Policy: Specific Formulas 
and Emission Targets to Build on Copenhagen and Cancun 
CCSD  67.2011  Mattia Cai, Roberto Ferrise, Marco Moriondo, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Marco Bindi: Climate Change and 
Tourism in Tuscany, Italy. What if heat becomes unbearable? 
ERM  68.2011  Morgan Bazilian, Patrick Nussbaumer, Hans-Holger Rogner, Abeeku Brew-Hammond, Vivien Foster, Shonali 
Pachauri, Eric Williams, Mark Howells, Philippe Niyongabo, Lawrence Musaba, Brian Ó Gallachóir, Mark 
Radka and Daniel M. Kammen: Energy Access Scenarios to 2030 for the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa
CCSD  69.2011  Francesco Bosello, Carlo Carraro and Enrica De Cian: Adaptation Can Help Mitigation: An Integrated 
Approach to Post-2012 Climate Policy 
ES  70.2011  Etienne Farvaque, Alexander Mihailov and Alireza Naghavi: The Grand Experiment of Communism: 
Discovering the Trade-off between Equality and Efficiency 
CCSD  71.2011  ZhongXiang Zhang: Who Should Bear the Cost of China’s Carbon Emissions Embodied in Goods for 
Exports? CCSD  72.2011  Francesca Pongiglione: Climate Change and Individual Decision Making: An Examination of Knowledge, Risk 
Perception, Self-interest and Their Interplay 
CCSD  73.2011  Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins: Using the Market to Address Climate Change: Insights from Theory 
and Experience 
CCSD  74.2011  Alexander Brauneis and Michael Loretz: Inducing Low-Carbon Investment in the Electric Power Industry 
through a Price Floor for Emissions Trading 
CCSD  75.2011  Jean-Marie Grether, Nicole A. Mathys and Jaime de Melo: Unravelling the Worldwide Pollution Haven Effect 
ES  76.2011  Benjamin Elsner: Emigration and Wages: The EU Enlargement Experiment 
CCSD  77.2011  ZhongXiang Zhang: Trade in Environmental Goods, with Focus on Climate-Friendly Goods and Technologies
ES  78.2011  Alireza Naghavi, Julia Spies and Farid Toubal: International Sourcing, Product Complexity and Intellectual 
Property Rights 
CCSD  79.2011  Mare Sarr and Tim Swanson: Intellectual Property and Biodiversity: When and Where are Property Rights 
Important? 
CCSD  80.2011  Valentina Bosetti, Sergey Paltsev, John Reilly and Carlo Carraro: Emissions Pricing to Stabilize Global 
Climate 
CCSD  81.2011  Valentina Borsetti and Enrica De Cian: A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate 
Action 
CCSD  82.2011  Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins: The Promise and Problems of Pricing Carbon: Theory and Experience 
CCSD  83.2011  Lei Zhu, ZhongXiang Zhang and Ying Fan: An Evaluation of Overseas Oil Investment Projects under 
Uncertainty Using a Real Options Based Simulation Model 
CCSD  84.2011  Luca Di Corato, Michele Moretto and Sergio Vergalli: Land Conversion Pace under Uncertainty and 
Irreversibility: too fast or too slow? 
 